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Abstract 
This study investigates the efficacy of public R&D support. Compared to most existing 
studies, we do not stop at substitution effects or general innovation outcome measures, but we 
are interested in knowing where the policy effect is highest: on innovation close to the market 
(i.e. incremental innovation) or on innovation that is still far from the market and hence more 
risky and radical. Using firm level data from the period 1999 to 2011, we find that the policy 
hits where the market failure is highest, that is, for radical innovation. Taking into account 
that the Swiss funding agency encourages collaboration, we find no evidence that the impact 
of the policy is positively effected by various R&D collaboration patterns. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is largely acknowledged to be a main factor of a country’s sustainable and 
competitive development (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Griliches, 1979; Romer, 1990). It is also 
recognized that due to market imperfections, firms are unlikely to reap all the benefits from 
their research, leading to un underinvestment in R&D. Therefore, governmental support is a 
widely accepted means to foster socially valuable innovation.  
The concept of market imperfection goes back to Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), who state 
that firms do not invest the socially desired level in R&D efforts due to market imperfections 
including limited approbiability, lower private than social returns, financial market 
constraints, high risks about technological standards, high costs and high uncertainty of R&D 
projects and further forms of negative externalities (Martin & Scott, 2000). The implications 
of this under-investment in R&D have encouraged policy makers to establish public support 
mechanisms. In the current paper, we are interested in one particular type of support, namely 
direct funding for R&D projects. More precisely, we aim at contributing to the an on-going 
debate about the returns of public R&D funding (Jones & Williams, 1998; Salter & Martin, 
2001), and in particular about whether public money is used in the most efficient way (David 
& Hall, 2000; David, Hall, & Toole, 2000; Klette, Møen, & Griliches, 2000). In order to do 
so, we investigate the impact of a public support policy on outcome characteristics that have 
so far largely been ignored. Specifically, we analyse where the policy effect is highest: on 
R&D projects concerning research close to the market (i.e. incremental innovation) or on 
R&D projects concerning more basic and hence radical and risky innovation. Based on the 
market failure theory stipulating that under-investment in R&D may be particularly 
pronounced for more basic and radical innovations because of the high uncertainty linked to 
3/37 
such projects, one would expect to see an effect of public support on radical rather than on 
incremental innovation. Furthermore, given that funding agencies want to stimulate socially 
desirable projects that would not be undertaken without public support, one would assume 
that agencies target more basic and radical research in particular. Yet, so far it has not been 
investigated empirically whether such selection mechanisms are reflected in the impact of 
publicly induced R&D on product innovation. As a first and main contribution, this paper 
therefore disentangles the effects of the policy according to the degree of novelty of the 
products, thereby estimating if the policy effect is highest where the market imperfections are 
more pronounced. Going further, we analyse these effects in light of various collaboration 
patters, as collaboration is typically encouraged by funding agencies and hence constitutes an 
important part in the funding policy. While the impact of subsidized collaborating firms has 
been analysed before (see for instance Czarnitzki et al. (2007) or Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014a)), scholars have not differentiated according to the type of partner, respectively to 
partner diversity in this context. Accounting for the diversity of partners a firm can 
collaborate with (i.e. vertical, horizontal or diagonal), this paper sheds light as to whether, on 
the one hand, (the type of) collaboration partners of a firm impacts input additionality and, on 
the other hand, (the type of) collaboration partners impacts subsequent product innovation, 
differentiating between incremental and radical innovation. Finally, the present study is 
undertaken on a representative sample of Swiss firms. Even though Switzerland is considered 
an innovation leader among the OECD, it has not received as much attention as many other 
countries on this subject.  
We base our analysis on a representative firm-level data-set covering the period between 
1999 to 2011 of the Swiss innovation survey. Contrasting our findings from econometric 
treatment effects estimations and  heterogeneity robust tobit models to a series of robustness 
checks, we find that, on average, the receipt of an R&D subsidy translates into higher R&D 
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investment. In terms of output additionality, we find that the impact of public support is only 
significant for radical innovation. No impact of policy-induced R&D is found for incremental 
innovation. In contrast, collaborative R&D only displays significant results on incremental 
innovation. Contrary to expectations, we do not find evidence that the impact of the policy is 
improved through collaboration. We can thus conclude that while the Swiss public R&D 
policy is efficient in terms of stimulating R&D investment and in terms of intervening where 
the market imperfections are highest, the current tendency of encouraging R&D collaboration 
does not seem to enhance such effects. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section two presents the Swiss innovation 
policy. Section three puts our research question into the recent literature. Section four 
outlines the methodology. The data is explained in section five. Section six presents the 
results and section seven concludes.  
2 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE SWISS INNOVATION POLICY  
Many countries have launched innovation policy programs to promote national 
innovativeness and competitiveness. An outstanding performance in R&D and innovation 
activities is considered an important factor not only for economic growth but also for a 
sustainable economic perspective in terms of employment, ecology and education for a 
modern knowledge society. In Switzerland, public funding of R&D has increased by 5.3% 
between 2000 and 2010. In 2010, the financial budget for appropriations or outlays dedicated 
to R&D covers an amount of 4.6 billion CHF, which corresponds to 0.81% of the country’s 
GDP. In an international comparison (measures from 2008), Switzerland holds the eleventh 
rank of 31 OECD countries with public R&D funding corresponding to 0.73% of the 
country’s GDP. The United States (1.02%) and Finland (0.98%) are on the top positions of 
the public funding per GDP ratio (FSO, 2012).  
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In Switzerland there are two major R&D funding agencies providing public grants for R&D 
programs and projects—the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Commission 
for Technology and Innovation (CTI)—with a total budget of 1.0 billion CHF in 2010. While 
the SNSF is mainly in charge to provide public grants to R&D projects or programs 
conducted by public research institutes or by individual researchers, the CTI is responsible 
funding agency for R&D projects in the private sector, with a total budget of 118 Mio CHF in 
2010. As a consequence, the subsidies under review in this study mainly stem from the CTI. 
The subsidy scheme is not based on calls for proposals, but firms can apply with R&D 
projects all year long. Likewise, there are no restrictions in terms of technology fields 
supported by the agencies. Nonetheless, the CTI has the general goal to stimulate innovation 
in SMEs and encourages joint R&D activities between private companies and public research 
institutes. The focus of the policy is two-fold: on the one hand, the agency provides support 
for applied and market-oriented R&D projects which lead to the generation of new 
technologies and insights that are realizable in short or medium term to strengthen the 
country’s innovation position (CTI, 2011). On the other hand, the CTI also supports high risk 
but promising projects, including early stage pilot installations. Applicant firms have to 
provide a detailed description on the project’s impact and a clear business and financial plan. 
The ex-ante evaluation is done by external and internal referees, which evaluate the expected 
effectiveness of the R&D projects. In 2010, 780 projects were evaluated, and 343 (44%) 
projects have been retained for public support (CTI, 2013). In case of a positive evaluation, 
the firm receives a subsidy in form of a matched grant, where the public funding typically 
covers up to approximately 50% of the expected costs (in 2010 the average subsidy rate was 
of  41% of the project costs) (CTI, 2011, 2013). In 2010, 667 firms are involved in co-funded 
R&D projects, among which almost three quarters (74%) were SMEs (CTI, 2013). The 
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average project duration in the period 2009-2011 was of 20 months and the average project 
size amounted to 682.2 thousand Swiss francs.
1
  
3 OUR RESEARCH QUESTION IN LIGHT OF RECENT LITERATURE 
Empirical evidence on R&D subsidies is common in the literature to date. In terms of input 
additionality, it has been shown that the null hypothesis of full-crowing out can be rejected in 
the vast majority of cases. Indeed, Hall and Maffioli (2008) have found that in empirical 
literature since 2000, total crowding out effects were only found for the US Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program, analysed by Wallsten (2000).
2
 In terms of output 
additionality, evidence confirms that subsidies have a positive impact on innovation 
performance, as measured for instance by patent outcome (see e.g. Czarnitzki and Hussinger 
(2004) or Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) for a sample of German firms) or novelty sales 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2011).  
What has not received attention in the literature so far however, is the impact of R&D 
subsidies on the type of the subsequent product novelty. Put differently, while some studies 
have investigated whether publicly induced R&D investment translates into marketable 
products (see for instance Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a)), those studies have not 
differentiated between the degree of novelty of products. That is, they have not made a 
difference between incremental and radical innovation. However, this influence can 
constitute an important choice in terms of innovation strategy for the firm as well as in terms 
of evaluation strategy for the policy maker. Indeed, when a firm decides to invest in 
innovation, it can either opt for a safer strategy by favouring investment in incremental 
innovation, or it can opt for the riskier strategy by investing in radical R&D. Even though 
incremental innovation is unlikely to dramatically change firm performance, sustained 
incremental innovation is required to prevent a firm from falling behind its competitors and 
ensuring its prospects of long-term survival. Radical innovation, on the other hand, has the 
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potential to push the technological frontier of a firm or even sector and may allow a firm to 
enter new markets. While the latter type of innovation has a higher potential to have a 
fundamental impact on firm performance, it is also involved with higher costs and substantial 
risks. It may thus well be that projects of radical R&D nature are less likely to be undertaken 
as firms have to be willing to bear the inherent risk of this endeavour. Since the assumption is 
that firms are often risk-averse, this could lead to a sub-optimal allocation of risk, meaning 
that there will be discrimination against projects of more radical or risky nature (Arrow & 
Lind, 1970). One could thus assume that firms seek funding primarily for this type of project 
and that it is also this type of project that is favoured by a funding agency. Yet, in the short 
and medium-term, output from less radical projects may be more visible, both for the firm as 
well as for the policy maker accountable for the public expenditures. Hence, it is difficult to 
predict ex-ante where the policy effect will be highest and whether the selection process of 
the funding agency is efficient in light of the type of innovation in which the additional 
investment will be destined to.  
Finally, it has long been acknowledged that R&D collaboration may play an important role, 
for the type as well as the success of innovation projects. Allowing to limit outgoing 
spillovers by internalizing them to the research consortium and providing access to 
complementary know-how and resources of partnering firms, it has been shown that R&D 
collaboration can enhance private R&D activities substantially (see for instance D'Aspremont 
& Jacquemin, 1988; DeBondt, 1997; Kamien, Muller, & Zang, 1992; Katz, 1986). Empirical 
findings confirm the positive effects of R&D collaboration on innovation input and output, 
and emphasize the importance of openness towards external sources of knowledge and 
external partners (Becker & Dietz, 2004; Belderbos, Carree, & Lokshin, 2004b; Leiponen & 
Helfat, 2010). In line with our emphasis on the importance of the type of innovation, further 
studies acknowledge the existence of heterogeneity in the motives and objectives for 
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collaboration (Belderbos, Carree, Diederen, Lokshin, & Veugelers, 2004a; de Faria, Lima, & 
Santos, 2010; Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 2005; Kaiser, 2002). Differentiating between 
four types of cooperation partners—competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities and 
research institutes—Belderbos et al. (2004a) demonstrate in their study that collaboration 
with competitors and suppliers aims at fostering incremental innovation while collaboration 
with universities and competitors intends to pursue more market or radical innovations. 
However, collaboration in R&D is also linked to certain risks, like for instance collusion in 
the product market, and the risks of leaking out knowledge due to outgoing spillovers (e.g. 
Czarnitzki et al., 2007). Furthermore, to be able to fully benefit from collaboration, a firm 
needs to build up specific competences and maintain a fruitful level of absorptive capacity to 
manage and coordinate collaborations efficiently and effectively. Otherwise, outgoing 
spillover effects might be higher than incoming spillover effects for some partners of the 
consortium, leading to the costs of collaboration being higher than the gains. This may be 
especially true when a firm builds on a great diversity of external knowledge sources and 
collaboration partners, as has been pointed out by Laursen and Salter (2006), and Beck and 
Schenker-Wicki (2014). Finally, incomplete contracts resulting from poor bargaining and 
costs of disclosure that are inherently linked to collaboration may render collaborative R&D 
costly if collaboration exceeds a certain threshold (Hottenrott & Lopes-Bento, 2014b).   
While each of these topics has received a lot of attention in the literature when 
considered individually, less attention has been attributed to how they interact. Even though  
some studies analyse the impact of subsidized R&D collaboration on output additionality, 
these studies do not differentiate between the number or type of partners, nor between the 
degree of novelty of the outcome.
3
 Hence, a series of crucial policy characteristics remain 
pending. The current analysis aims at filling this gap, as we argue that both these aspects are 
not only essential for policy makers but also for firm managers.  
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From a policy point of view, it is essential to know if the ex-ante project evaluation is 
appropriate to prevent firms from crowding-out of private R&D expenditure due to public 
R&D funding. Therefore, in a first step, we investigate the effectiveness of the policy scheme 
and test if the subsidy leads to input additionality. In a second step, we analyse how this 
policy induced R&D expenditures translate into innovation output, differentiating between 
radical and incremental innovation. Even in case of positive input additionality, it remains 
unclear if the publicly induced R&D is as productive as the privately induced R&D. In case 
of equal (or even higher) productivity, it remains so far undefined whether the impact is 
highest where market failures are strongest. Finally, our analysis is done taking the number 
(and type) of collaborating partners into account, given that policy increasingly encourages 
firms to collaborate in their R&D activities. It thus seem crucial that policy makers know 
whether this policy achieves its goal or whether the costs of collaboration undermine its 
benefits in certain cases.  
In contrast to most policy evaluation studies, our analysis also allows drawing conclusions 
from a managerial perspective. Indeed, from a managerial perspective, it is important for 
project managers to know where the impact of R&D subsidy is highest in order for them to 
best adapt grant applications to innovation strategies. Likewise, knowing whether input 
and/or output additionality is enhanced through collaboration (as well as through the type and 
number of collaborators), seems an essential information for a manager in order to optimize 
his R&D project portfolio. 
4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY  
Input additionality analysis  
In the first step of our analysis, we are interested in estimating the treatment effect of the 
R&D subsidy on firms’ R&D investments. As subsidies are not randomly distributed, one has 
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to take the selection into the funding program into account in the evaluation analysis. Indeed, 
subsidized firms might differ from non-subsidized firms in important characteristics, and 
therefore the selection into the treatment has to be taken into account (Heckman, LaLonde, & 
Smith, 1999; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008). While several modern econometric techniques 
exist allowing to address such a selection bias, our study applies a non-parametric propensity 
score matching (Angrist, 1998; Gerfin & Lechner, 2002; Lechner, 1999; Smith & Todd, 
2005). The econometric matching allows to directly reply to the question of how much a 
subsidized firm would have invested in R&D if it would be in a counterfactual situation of 
not having received public support. Compared to other methods such as the difference-in-
difference estimator or selection models, the econometric matching requires neither panel 
data nor imposes functional form assumptions. For the data at hand (to be described in detail 
in the next section), this thus seems the most adequate estimation approach.  
Given that this counterfactual situation of how much a subsidized firm would have invested 
in R&D if it would not have received a subsidy is never observable, it has to be estimated. 
Based on the assumption that we observe all the important characteristics driving the 
selection into the treatment (that is, provided that the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) is respected (Rubin, 1977)), we can approximate this counterfactual situation by firms 
having the same (or very similar) characteristics than the subsidized firms, but have not 
received any support. In order to find such similar “twins”, we balance the subsamples of 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms according to the probability of receiving a subsidy. Put 
differently, based on a probit estimation, we obtain the conditional probability of receiving a 
subsidy in a single index, the propensity score. Based on this index, we apply a nearest 
neighbour matching estimation and use for each subsidized firm the single nearest neighbour 
to estimate the counterfactual situation (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
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1985). On top of matching on the propensity score, we further require firms of the treated and 
control groups to belong to the same year and the same industry.
 
 
The average treatment effect on the treated is estimated as follows: 
      
 
  
∑ (    
     ̂ 
 ) 
 
          (1) 
where R&Di
T  
indicates R&D expenditures of treated firms and    ̂ 
   the counterfactual 
situation, i.e. the potential outcome which would have been realized if the treatment group 
(S=1) had not been treated. S   {   } indicates the receipt of a subsidy and NT the number of 
treated firms.  
Finally, in order for the matching to be possible, enough common support is needed between 
the sample of treated firms and the sample of potential control firms. In other words, the 
samples of treated and control firms need to have enough overlap in terms of probability of 
receiving a subsidy. We thus delete observations on treated firms with probabilities larger 
than the maximum and smaller than the minimum of the potential control group. 
Effectiveness of the R&D policy 
In a second part, we turn to the analysis of how the additional policy-induced R&D 
investment translates into innovation performance. More precisely, provided that we find 
positive input additionality, we want to know whether the publicly induced R&D investment 
impacts radical or incremental innovations (or both).  
Taking into account that not every firm in our sample has new product sales in each period, 
our outcome measures are characterized by a corner solution around zero (Tobin, 1958). For 
our analysis, we therefore use Tobit models to give point to these censored dependent 
variables.  
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In order to disentangle public form private R&D investment, we estimate the policy impact at 
the firm level in the same fashion as  Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) as follows: 
  
           ̂
 
         (2) 
where    ̂   is equal to R&D intensity for the counterfactual firms. Indeed, for non-
subsidized firms, for which   
   is equal to zero,    ̂   corresponds to their private R&D 
investment.  
The tobit model for          can then be estimated as follows: 
                 ,               
         (3.1) 
         {
                      
           
      (3.2) 
where          is the non-negative observable innovation performance variable, capturing 
radical innovation at the firm level.          corresponds to the latent dependent variable 
          if latter is above zero, and to zero otherwise. The model on the latent dependent 
variable,           is estimated by a parameter vector  , and a vector of firm characteristics 
  . The latter relationship is affected by a normally distributed error, to capture randomized 
firm influences. The model on incremental innovation is estimated analogously.  
In order for the estimates of a Tobit estimation to be consistent (see Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 
680-687), homoscedasticity is required. Given that we found evidence for heteroscedasticity 
based on an Likelihood Ratio test, we estimate heteroscedastic robust tobit models by 
maximum likelihood. Therefore, we replace the homoscedastic standard error term σ with σi 
= σexp(Z’α) in the likelihood function, modeling for group-wise multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity by including firm size and industry dummies. Accounting the fact that our 
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estimates for R&D investments (  
  ,    ̂ ) are estimated values for the treated firms, 
ordinary standard errors would be biased. We thus correct our standard errors by conducting 
a bootstrapping procedure.
4
   
5 DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION  
Data 
For the empirical analysis, the study uses a large-scale sample firms, derived from five waves 
(1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011) of the Swiss innovation survey. The Swiss innovation 
survey is a postal survey conducted by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute at the ETH Zurich, 
and corresponds largely to the European Community Innovation Survey following the OECD 
guidelines (OECD, 1992). Our data set provides us with a representative sample, covering 
both manufacturing and service industries. The data set contains detailed information on 
firms’ R&D and innovation activities, performance measures, subsidy receipts, and other firm 
characteristics. The response rates from the surveys are: 33.8% (1999), 39.6% (2002), 38.7% 
(2005), 36.1% (2008), and 35.9% (2011). After eliminating missing values, and limiting our 
sample to innovating firms only, we are left with 6084 observations from 3552 different firms 
out of which 546 received a subsidy. 
Dependent variables 
Our analysis is separated into two main parts. For the treatment effects analysis, our outcome 
variable reflects the firms’ R&D investment measured as the R&D expenditures to total 
turnover (RDINT). In the second part, our outcome variables indicate radical innovation 
performance (RADICAL), measured as the sales share of radical innovative products—which 
are products new to the market or new to the firm, and incremental innovation performance 
(INCREMENTAL), measured as the sales share of significantly improved products.
5
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Main explanatory variables 
The receipt of a subsidy is indicated by a dummy (PUBSUB) equal to one for subsidized 
firms and zero otherwise. Privately invested R&D expenditures and publicly induced 
expenditure are denoted by    ̂  and   
   respectively. 
As an important part of our setting is to analyse the role of collaboration pattern, we account 
for various collaboration partners as well as the number of collaboration partners by 
including several variables to capture different collaboration constellations. A dummy 
(RDCOOP) simply indicates if a firm is engaged in R&D collaboration. Taking into account 
the effects of increased collaboration engagement, we define a continuous variable 
(COOPPART) accounting for different external collaborating partners (suppliers, clients, 
competitors, non-competitors, firms from the same corporate group, universities, and other 
research institutions). Following Belderbos et al. (2004b) we further distinguish between 
vertical (CO_VERT), horizontal collaboration (CO_HOR), and collaboration with science 
(CO_SCIE).  
Other control variables  
We further control for a set of variables which might influence the selection into public 
funding  and/or drive innovation performance. 
Having received a subsidy in the past might demonstrate existing competence and capabilities 
of the applicant and hence might influence the agency to select this firm again for a grant. We 
thus control for previous subsidies, where PAST_SUBSIDY equals one if a firm has received 
a subsidy in the past three years. Existing R&D capabilities may also be reflected in existing 
patents at the firm level. Indeed, patents may be a valid signal of previously successful R&D 
engagement. Consequently, we include a variable (PAT_EMPL) measuring successfully 
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approved patents per 1,000 employees to avoid potential multicollinearity with firm size. We 
further control for firm age (FIRMAGE) and (the log of) firm size (LNFIRMSIZE), as these 
are important characteristics in the funding scheme of the agency. Additionally, we take a 
non-linear relationship into account and control for the squared term of the two previously 
mentioned variables (FIRMAGE2, LNFIRMSIZE2). Labour productivity might also influence 
the agency in the approval process, as it can be seen as an indicator for high firm 
competitiveness. We include the natural logarithm of the sales share per employee 
(LNLABPROD). As stated by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity is essential to 
integrate new knowledge. We therefore control for share of workforce with tertiary education 
in total employment (EMPACA). We further  control for the fact that  a firm belongs to a 
foreign group (FOREIGN). Subsidiaries with a foreign parent may be less likely to receive 
subsidies, because the parent may prefer to apply in its home country. Likewise, funding 
agencies may have a preference for local firms. Furthermore, foreign parents with local 
subsidiaries are typically larger firms and may therefore not be the priority target of the 
funding agency as SMEs generally constitute the main target group. It could, however, also 
be that firms belonging to a group may look attractive to a funding agency as the group 
membership possibly promises knowledge spillovers and thus economies of scope from the 
R&D process that go beyond national borders. It is thus unclear whether having a foreign 
parent plays favourably or not in receiving a subsidy from a Swiss funding agency. We take 
foreign market activities of a firm into account by controlling for its export activities. Highly 
export orientated firms might be more innovative, and hence more likely to apply for a 
subsidy. Export activities are measured by the export share to total turnover (EXPORT). In 
addition, we account for the level of general technological potential of a firm (TECHPOT) 
indicating the level of scientific and technological knowledge available to the firm for 
conducting innovation activities. TECHPOT is measured on a five point Likert-scale, where 
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five indicates a high technological potential of the focal firm.  Finally, five survey year 
dummies and seven industry sector dummies complement our set of control variables. 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in our analysis; industry and size class 
distribution of our sample are displayed in Table A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. As presented 
in Table 1, there exist significant differences in the means of almost all variables between the 
subsidized firms and the non-subsidized firms. For instance, on average, subsidized firms are 
more likely to have experience in the past with subsidies, are slightly larger, have more 
approved patents per employee, have a higher likelihood belonging to a foreign group, have a 
higher educated workforce, are more export-oriented, have a higher technological potential, 
and engage more in R&D collaboration. Notably, they do not differ in firm age, and labour 
productivity. With respect to the outcome variable, in alignment with our expectation, 
subsidized firms have on average higher R&D investments. However, at this point, we do not 
know how much of these additional R&D expenditures are induced by the subsidy or are due 
to other firm characteristics. 
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Table  1  Descriptive statistics on innovating firms. 
 
Unsubsidized firms,  
N = 5,538 
Subsidized firms,  
N = 546 
Results of t-
tests on 
mean 
differences 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
 
  Covariates   
PAST_SUBSIDY 0.016 0.124 0.203 0.403 *** 
FIRMAGE 65.2 42.2 68.2 54.0  
FIRMAGE2 6034.9 10583.9 7562.7 21140.4 * 
LNFIRMSIZE 4.269 1.410 4.930 1.515 *** 
LNFIRMSIZE2 20.215 13.411 26.597 16.368 *** 
PAT_EMPL 12.904 143.565 31.965 90.542 *** 
LNLABPROD 12.509 0.752 12.505 0.650  
FOREIGN 0.158 0.365 0.200 0.400 ** 
EMPACA 5.760 11.413 11.875 16.974 *** 
EXPORT 25.498 34.307 51.031 38.591 *** 
RDCOOP 0.186 0.389 0.639 0.481 *** 
TECHPOT 2.788 1.144 3.484 0.977 *** 
  Outcome variable   
RDINT 1.400 3.894 5.747 13.606 *** 
Source: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the Swiss 
Economic Institute (KOF). 
 
 
6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Average effect of  public funding on subsidized firms  
As described above, we employ a matching estimation to identify the average treatment effect 
of public R&D grants on the treated firms. To be able to apply the matching estimator, we 
need to predict the probability of receiving public R&D funding. Therefore, we estimate a 
probit model on a subsidy receipt incorporating important characteristics for the selection into 
the funding scheme. As can be seen in Table 2, with the exception of firm age, patents per 
employee, and being member of a foreign group, all our covariates are important drivers for 
the selection into the treatment.  
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Table  2  Probit estimation on the probability of receiving a 
subsidy.  
Variables Coefficient Standard errors 
PAST_SUBSIDY    1.149*** (0.100)  
FIRMAGE -0.001 (0.000)  
FIRMAGE2 0.000 (0.000)  
LNFIRMSIZE    0.142*   (0.090)  
LNFIRMSIZE2 -0.004 (0.010)  
PAT_EMPL 0.000 (0.000)  
LNLABPROD   -0.217*** (0.040)  
FOREIGN -0.082 (0.070)  
EMPACA    0.013*** (0.000)  
EXPORT    0.004*** (0.000)  
RDCOOP    0.770*** (0.060)  
TECHPOT    0.148*** (0.030)  
N 6084  
Log likelihood  -1392.4211  
Joint significance of industry 
dummies χ2(6) = 19.92***  
Joint significance of survey year 
dummies χ2(4) = 27.01***  
Note: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted 
by the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF). The model includes a constant, 
industry and survey year dummies (not presented). *** (**, *) indicate a 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our econometric matching estimation. We can see that all our 
covariates are well-balanced after the matching. This points to the fact that our matching was 
successful and that we found a close neighbour for each of our treated firms. The only 
variable that remains statistically significant is the outcome variable. We can thus attribute 
this difference to the treatment and can conclude that, in line with the literature, full crowding 
out can be rejected.   
In order to take a potential selection on unobservables into account, we  test the robustness of 
our matching estimation by  conducting an IV regression. The results of the IV regression as 
well as the choice of our IVs are presented in detail Appendix 2 (Table A.4). Conclusions 
remain unchanged even if we allow for a selection on unobservables.  
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Table  3  Average treatment effect of public R&D funding. 
 Selected control group, N=530 Subsidized firms, N=530 
p-value of t-tests 
on mean 
differences 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
 
  Covariates   
PAST_SUBSIDY 0.145 0.353 0.179 0.384 0.195 
FIRMAGE 69.8 47.2 68.4 54.1 0.707 
FIRMAGE2 7097.0 11617.0 7605.1 21382.6 0.656 
LNFIRMSIZE 4.765 1.452 4.891 1.485 0.234 
LNFIRMSIZE2 24.815 14.577 26.120 15.855 0.228 
PAT_EMPL 20.623 54.565 28.963 79.044 0.072 
LNLABPROD 12.483 0.668 12.496 0.648 0.784 
FOREIGN 0.183 0.387 0.198 0.399 0.591 
EMPACA 12.578 19.054 11.259 16.303 0.311 
EXPORT 49.026 38.315 50.302 38.537 0.644 
RDCOOP 0.632 0.483 0.628 0.484 0.913 
TECHPOT 3.453 1.015 3.457 0.974 0.958 
  Outcome variables   
RDINT 3.453 5.859 5.698 13.717 0.001 
Note: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the Swiss Economic 
Institute (KOF). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 16 observations are lost 
because of the common support condition. 
 
 
Impact of firm collaboration patterns on the estimated treatment effect 
Even though collaboration is not a full requirement to receive a subsidy, the funding agency 
encourages collaboration engagement of the applicant firms. We are therefore interested in 
knowing whether (and to which extent) the created additionality is impacted by specific 
collaboration patterns. In order to identify the effect of collaboration, we run three different 
OLS regressions, regressing the individual treatment effect on the previously defined 
collaboration variables. The results are presented in Table 4. The result in Model 1, where we 
regress the additionality created by a subsidy on a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is an 
R&D collaborator, shows no statistical significant impact. In Model 2, we therefore control 
for the diversity of collaboration partners (COOPPART ϵ [1, 7]) rather than a mere dummy. 
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Surprisingly, we detect a negative significant effect of increased collaboration engagement on 
the treatment effect. I.e. having more than one collaboration partner at the same time has a 
negative impact of subsidy additionality. When differentiating between the types of 
collaboration partner (Model 3), our results show that the negative effects are driven by 
collaboration with suppliers, while collaboration with other partners has no impact on 
additionality. 
6
 
The fact that collaboration exhibits a negative impact seems rather surprising, given that 
typically positive impacts of R&D collaboration on R&D activities are found. As we 
mentioned in the previous paragraph however, collaboration is also linked to a number of 
costs. In terms of created additionality, it seems that the costs outweigh the benefits for the 
firms in our sample. In the next section we will analyze how specific collaboration patterns 
influence product novelty sales, due to private investment as well as due to policy induced 
investment, which will enable us to conclude if collaborative research impacts input and 
output differently. 
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Table 4 OLS regression models on the individual treatment effect,   
  , taking into 
account the collaboration pattern of the subsidized firms, N=530. 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 
RDCOOP   -3.294                             
  
(2.00)                         
  COOPPART 
   
  -0.914***            
 
    
(0.34)             
 Cooperation with CUSTOMERS  
   
            
 
1.064 
                               
   
            
 
(2.06) 
...SUPPLIERS                     
   
            
 
  -5.192*** 
                               
   
            
 
(1.91) 
...COMPETITORS 
   
            
 
-1.015 
                               
   
            
 
(1.47) 
...FIRMS FROM OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 
   
            
 
-1.318 
                               
   
            
 
(1.44) 
... FIRMS FROM THE SAME 
COMPANY GROUP 
   
            
 
0.684 
                               
   
            
 
(2.11) 
...UNIVERSITIES 
   
            
 
1.079 
                               
   
            
 
(2.48) 
...OTHER RESEARCH ENTITIES 
   
            
 
-1.791 
                               
   
            
 
(1.76) 
Intercept 
 
   4.315**  
 
   4.347*** 
 
   4.098*** 
    (1.78) 
 
(1.50) 
 
(1.56) 
Number of observations 530 530 530 
 
Overall significance 
F(1, 409) =  2.71 F(1, 409) =  7.14 F( 7, 409) = 2.12 
Prob > F =  0.100 Prob > F  =  0.008 Prob > F = 0.040 
Source: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the Swiss Economic 
Institute (KOF). Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as some firms appear more than 
once in the sample. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
The impact on innovation performance  
In the following section, we turn to the analysis on innovation performance, as measured by 
the sales share of radically and incrementally new products respectively. The average sales 
share from radically new products is of 14.4% in our sample. Incremental innovations 
account for 16.7% of the total turnover of the firms in our sample.   
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Table 5 displays the results of the heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit models on innovation 
outcome. Models one to four relate to the impact of the both types of R&D investment on 
radical innovation, while models five to eight relate to incremental innovation. The various 
models per category take into account different collaboration patterns.  
All models exhibit a positive impact of privately invested R&D,     ̂ , on the sales share of 
new products, radical or incremental alike. When considering the baseline models (Model 1 
and Model 5), we see that the coefficients are similar in size, pointing to the fact that the 
impact of the counterfactual R&D investment is not significantly different between both 
types of innovation. Put differently, the private money invested by firms displays a 
significant impact on incremental as well as on radical innovation which is similar in 
magnitude. A 10% increase in the counterfactual R&D investment would lead to a 4 
percentage point increase in the estimated latent dependent variable, i.e. the estimated sales 
share in radical innovation sales, on average, and a 3 percentage point increase in the 
estimated sales share for incremental innovation sales.  
While this finding is in line with our expectations, the effects related to the publicly induced 
R&D investment,   
    strive our attention. The results show a positive and statistically 
significant effect of the publicly induced R&D investment on radical innovation (Model 1), 
while the effect on incremental innovation is insignificant (Model 5). Even though officially 
the funding agency also supports projects with short- and medium-term marketable goals, this 
finding points to the fact that the publicly induced part of the R&D investment mainly 
impacts radical innovation.  Hence the goal of the agency to promote more basic and radical 
innovation seems to be attained. The impact of public support is highest where market 
failures are highest.    
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Given that the funding agency typically favours R&D collaborating firms, we are interested 
in knowing if these effects are impacted by collaboration behaviour. Since the mere dummy 
variable on collaboration did not display any significant impact on input additionality, we 
control for the number of different collaboration partners in our innovation performance 
equation (COOPPART) in the baseline models (Models 1 and 5). As we can gather from 
Table 5, significant results are only found for incremental innovation (Model 5). Indeed, we 
find that engaging into collaboration agreements with different partners induces, on average, 
an increase in the estimated sales share from incremental product novelties of roughly 8 
percentage points (Model 5). 
Going forward, we differentiate between the types of external collaboration partners, 
differentiating between horizontal, vertical and diagonal
7
. The analysis shows that neither one 
of the collaboration types has a significant impact when controlled for separately (see Models 
2 and 6). Finally, to see whether these effects change in light of the receipt of a subsidy, we 
interact privately as well as publicly induced R&D investment with collaboration patterns. 
Models 3 and 7 start by interacting partner diversity with both types of R&D investment. For 
incremental innovations (Model 7), we see that while the counterfactual R&D spending and 
collaborating with diverse partners stays significant and positive, the part of the private 
spending that is interacted with collaborators exhibits a negative impact. Hence, parts of the 
positive impact of private R&D spending turns negative when driven by collaboration with 
various partners. In line with the results from the baseline model, no statistically significant 
results are found for radical innovation output.  
Disentangling the types of collaboration by partner type, our results indicate that these 
negative effects are driven by collaboration with science for privately invested R&D on 
incremental innovation (Model 8), while in terms of policy-induced R&D investment, a 
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negative relation is found with horizontal collaboration. Consistent with previous results, no 
significant impacts are found for radical innovation (Model 4).  
While the results of Models 7 and 8 seem surprising, there may be several reasons able to 
explain such findings. Firstly, the negative effects of having several collaboration partners at 
the same time may be due to the fact that the costs of coordination and managing a 
(subsidized) partnership can be very high (see Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014). Secondly, 
when disentangling the type of collaboration, we see that the interaction between privately 
invested R&D and collaboration with science is negative. This may be due to the fact that 
collaboration with science is typically needed when firms intend doing path-breaking 
innovations, pushing the technological frontier. For incremental innovation, such type of 
collaboration is therefore not necessarily attractive, and may deviate resources from where 
they could have been invested more appropriately in terms of incremental change to existing 
products. Hence, if the strategy of the firm is to ensure long-term survival perspectives 
through incremental innovation rather than investing into radical innovation, it seems that 
collaborating with science is not maximizing its partnership behaviour.  
In terms of policy effect in light of collaboration type, our results do not show any evidence 
that subsidized collaborating firms are more productive in terms of new products than non-
subsidized firms. To the contrary, we even find a weak, yet negative results for the interaction 
of policy driven investment and horizontal collaboration. 
Before concluding, it should be noted that we took potential endogeneity of our collaboration 
variables into account. In Appendix 3, we  estimate a structural equation as introduced by 
Blundell and  Smith (1986) to see if our results are driven by endogenetiy. As shown by the 
results in Table A.5, our findings are not driven by endogeneity.
8
 
Table  5 Heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit estimates on radical and incremental innovation performance. 
  RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  
   0.370** 0.366** 0.248 0.237 0.518 0.526 0.402 0.289 
                               (0.15) (0.15) (0.31) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.39) (0.38) 
   ̂   0.434*** 0.428*** 0.431*** 0.548*** 0.319** 0.332** 0.726*** 0.770*** 
                               (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) 
COOPPART                       0.157             0.128             0.787***             1.272***             
                               (0.19)             (0.22)             (0.27)             (0.40)             
FIRMAGE                        -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.118*** 
                               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
                               (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LNFIRMSIZE                     0.924 0.934 0.969 1.018 -0.714 -0.739 -0.763 -0.627 
                               (0.92) (0.92) (0.94) (0.97) (1.16) (1.15) (1.15) (1.12) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                    -0.103 -0.104 -0.107 -0.111 0.074 0.087 0.082 0.081 
                               (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
EXPORT                       0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 
                               (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TECHPOT                        1.353*** 1.336*** 1.359*** 1.276*** 1.932*** 2.006*** 1.831*** 1.838*** 
                               (0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.50) (2.93) (0.39) (0.43) (0.43) 
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CO_VERT                                    -0.542             -1.534             0.329             -1.172 
                                           (1.76)             (1.87)             (1.16)             (1.34) 
CO_HOR                                     0.227             0.074             3.334             4.707 
                                           (1.48)             (2.23)             (3.22)             (3.90) 
CO_SCIE                                    1.392             3.115             0.257             3.396* 
                                           (2.08)             (2.93)             (2.28)             (1.90) 
COOPPART*  
                           0.084                                     0.061             
                                                       (0.13)                                     (0.15)             
COOPPART*   ̂                           0.005                                     -0.187**             
                                                       (0.05)                                     (0.09)             
CO_VERT*  
                                       0.322                                     0.683 
                                                                   (0.67)                                     (0.80) 
CO_VERT*   ̂                                       0.383                                     0.431 
                                                                   (0.28)                                     (0.27) 
CO_HOR*  
                                       0.381                                     -0.847* 
                                                                   (0.49)                                     (0.51) 
CO_HOR*   ̂                                       0.077                                     -0.362 
                                                                   (0.42)                                     (0.31) 
CO_SCIE*  
                                       -0.073                                     0.135 
                                                                   (0.61)                                     (0.74) 
CO_SCIE*   ̂                                       -0.644                                     -1.103*** 
                                                                   (0.43)                                     (0.41) 
N 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 
Source: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF). Note: Standard deviations in parentheses are 
clustered at the firm level and bootstrapped with 150 replications. Time and industry dummies are jointly significant (not presented). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level 
of 1% (5%, 10%).
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7 CONCLUSION  
Our study is an extension of previous studies interested in the effects of public R&D polices 
on input and/or output additionality. Indeed, we contribute to current knowledge on the effect 
of such policy by providing evidence as to where the policy impact is highest. Furthermore, 
we take specific collaboration patterns into account to see whether these impacts are affected 
by the number or the type of partnering firms.  
In terms of input additionality, we find, in line with previous studies, evidence that allows 
rejecting the null hypothesis of full crowding out.  
Taking into account the degree of novelty in terms of innovation performance, this analysis 
fills a gap by providing evidence on where the policy effect hits most: on innovations close to 
the market (incremental innovations) or on innovations far from the market (radical 
innovations). Using data from the Swiss Innovation Survey, we find evidence that publicly 
induced investments display a positive and significant impact on radical innovation, while no 
significant impact on incremental innovation is found. This points to the fact that the policy 
effect does impact the firm where, left to itself, the constraints would have been highest.  
 Given that funding policy often encourage firms to collaborate in their R&D activities, our 
work integrates information on firms’ collaboration status. Compared to previous studies that 
only consider whether or not a firm qualifies as collaborator, we additionally account for 
specific types (and the number) of collaboration partners. We are thus able to investigate the 
effects of different collaboration constellations, i.e. horizontal, vertical and collaboration with 
science in our framework. We do not find any evidence that subsidized collaborating firms 
exhibit higher input additionality. To the contrary, having several partners simultaneoulsy 
even lowers the impact. While the type (and number) of collaboration partners does not 
display a significant impact on the sales share of radical innovation, it impacts incremental 
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innovation. Once interacted with policy effects, these impacts turn negative. Hence, the 
policy effect is not enhanced by a specific collaboration strategy and collaborative R&D 
should thus not necessarily constitute a priority for the Swiss funding agency.    
Combing strategic management literature on radical vs incremental innovation and on 
collaboration impacts with literature on policy evaluation, our study also allows drawing 
implications from a managerial perspective. From a managerial point of view, the findings 
are relevant from mainly two angles. In terms of subsidy strategy, it is vital for a manager to 
know that it is more likely for a subsidy to have the desired impact when used for more 
radical innovation projects. From a collaboration strategy perspective, it is important to know 
that there are also downsides to engaging into collaboration, especially with a number of 
diversified partners. Hence, if tempted to engage in additional R&D collaborations in order to 
increase the probability of receiving a subsidy, managers should be aware that there may also 
be downsides to this strategy. 
Despite all efforts, our analysis is not without limitation. One clear improvement would be to 
have access to panel data, allowing to follow firms over time. Furthermore, having more 
information about the selection process or about the rejected applicants would have allowed 
for a series of additional robustness checks to strengthen our findings.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Table  A.1  Descriptive statistics, industry distribution. 
Industry Number of firms Percentages 
1 Construction, mining, energy 441 7.25 
2 Consumer goods (food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing) 433 7.12 
3 Intermediate goods (paper, printing, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastics, minerals, basic metals) 1,051 17.27 
4 Investment goods (fabricated metals, machinery & equipment, 
electrical equipment, electronics and optical products, medical 
instruments, watches, vehicles, and other manufacturing) 2,111 34.7 
5 Traditional services (trade, transportation, 
telecommunications) 923 15.17 
6 Knowledge-based services (banking, insurance, information 
technology & services, technical commercial services)  874 14.37 
7 Other services 251 4.13 
Total 6,084 100 
 
Table  A.2  Descriptive statistics, firm size distribution. 
Size class Size class distribution Number of firms Percentages 
1 Small-sized firms 1 – 49 2,489 40.91 
2 Medium-sized 50 – 249 2,405 39.53 
3 Large-sized 250 – max. 1,190  19.56 
 Total 6,084 100 
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Appendix 2 
Robustness check for the matching estimation accounting for potential selection on 
unobservables 
An essential assumption to conduct a valid matching estimation is the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). Indeed, for the matching estimation to be valid, the outcome 
has to be statistically independent of program participation, conditional on a series of 
observable characteristics. This fundamental  assumption is however not testable. Therefore, 
we test the robustness of our matching estimation results by taking into account the selection 
on observables. We do so using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.  
To conduct our IV regression, we employ two instruments for the subsidy receipt. First, we 
use the likelihood of receiving a subsidy by region and industry (IV_1); and second, we use 
the likelihood of collaborating with science by industry (IV_2).  
IV_1 is justified by the fact that funding agencies often have preferences in terms of location 
or industries. Even though such priorities are not formal conditions, it may very well be that a 
firm based in direct proximity of a funding agency is more aware of the policy and is more 
visible to the decision makers than a firm that is situated further away. Hence, being part of a 
region or an industry where the likelihood of receiving a subsidy is high, is likely to impact 
the receipt of a subsidy of firm i. The rationale of using the industry average of collaboration 
with science institutions as an instrument (IV_2) documents the fact that some technological 
trajectories have closer relationships to universities and other research centres. Having a 
closer relationship to science collaboration increases the likelihood of being retained for 
funding, given that the Swiss government aims at increasing industry – science links.  
Both instruments fulfil the statistical tests for being valid instruments. In the first stage, both 
IVs are highly significant. In the second stage, the Hansen J-test of overidentification is 
insignificant. Hence, both from a statistical as well as from an economic point of view, our 
instruments are valid. As displayed in Table A.4, the results of the IV estimation are in line 
with what we find in our matching estimation.  
  
31/37 
Table  A.4 Robustness test with instrumental variable regressions for 
R&D intensity. 
  First stage Second stage 
Variables 
SUBSIDY 2SLS on R&DINT  
SUBSIDY_REG_IND (IV_1) 0.672***  
 
(0.058)  
CO_SCIE_IND (IV_2) 0.404***  
 (0.118)  
SUBSIDY  6.363*** 
  (1.804) 
PAST_SUBSIDY 0.330*** 0.424 
 (0.034) (1.719) 
FIRMAGE 0.000 -0.005* 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
FIRMAGE2 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE 0.003 -0.713** 
 (0.012) (0.342) 
LNFIRMSIZE2 0.001 0.049 
 (0.001) (0.032) 
PATCOUNT_E~L 0.000 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
LNLABPROD -0.012*** -0.636*** 
 (0.004) (0.157) 
FOREIGN -0.020* 0.515 
 (0.011) (0.331) 
EMPACA 0.002*** 0.083*** 
 (0.000) (0.020) 
FIRMCOMP 0.000*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) 
RDCOOP 0.135*** 0.030 
 (0.011) (0.372) 
TECHPOT 0.012*** 0.235*** 
 (0.003) (0.059) 
     N                          6084 6084 
Uncentered R2 0.291 0.232 
F-Test of excl. instruments  
F(2, 3551) =    
71.52***  
Hansen's J test statistic   χ2(1))= 0.971 
Note: IV_1 is the region and industry mean of the likelihood of receiving a subsidy. 
IV_2 is the industry sector mean of the likelihood of collaborating with science 
institutes. Both models include an intercept, time and industry dummies (not 
presented). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) 
indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Appendix 3 
Robustness check for potential endogeneity of the collaboration variable in the innovation 
outcome equation  
In our innovation outcome estimations, we face the problem that one of our main explanatory 
variable might be endogenous, namely our collaboration variables. In order to test if our 
results are affected by potential endogeneity, we conduct a structural equation approach 
introduced by Smith and Blundell (1986). For the sake of this robustness check, we defined 
two instrumental variables for our potential endogenous collaboration variable COOPPART 
following the advices of Murray (2006). Our first instrumental variable HAMP_IND, (IV_1) 
captures the importance of a wide range of hampering factors a firm is facing during its 
innovation activities, and is defined as the industry, firm size class and survey year mean of 
such hampering factors
9
. The underlying idea behind this instrument is that the higher the 
importance of manifold hampering factors is in close proximity in terms of technology and 
firm size class to a firm i in a given year, the higher is the probability that the firm i engages 
in a diversified collaboration pattern to counter these hampering factors. Our second 
instrumental variable KWSRC_IND (IV_2) is defined as the industry, survey year and firm 
size class mean of the diversity of knowledge sources used for conducting innovation 
activities. This instrument documents the reasoning that the more diverse knowledge sources 
are used for innovative activities in close proximity to a firm i, the higher the probability that 
the firm i is engaged in  collaboration agreements with divers types of partners
10
.  
To further test the statistical validity of our instruments employed for the Blundell-Smith test 
of exogeneity, we ran a couple of tests on the validity of the chosen instruments. It should be 
noted though that  we have to use the standard Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach, as 
standard tests of over-identification do not exist for the Blundell-Smith approach. Our two 
excluded instruments are jointly statistical significant at the 1%-level (F(2, 2930) = 11.10), 
and the Hansen J test of over-identification cannot be rejected for radical innovation 
performance (Hansen J statistic = .323, p=.570), nor for incremental innovation performance 
(Hansen J statistic = .284, p=.594). Finally, both our instruments are statistically significant 
in the first stage of the equation. Considering the above results, we can conclude that our two 
instrumental variables satisfy the statistical requirements. 
As can be see seen in Table A.5, the first stage residuals are not significant in the innovation 
outcome equations. Therefore, we can conclude that our findings are not driven by 
endogeneity.  
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Table  A.5 Robustness test with instrumental variable regressions for 
innovation outcome.  
  First stage Probit:  Second stage Tobit: Second stage Tobit: 
Variables 
COOPPART RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
HAMP_IND (IV_1)                        1.042*     
                               (0.54)    
KWSRC_IND (IV_2)                   1.285**    
                               (0.57)    
RDINT                             0.027***    0.455***    0.367*** 
                               (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
FIRMAGE                        0.001   -0.067***   -0.075*** 
                               (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
FIRMAGE2                       0.000    0.000***    0.000*** 
                               (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
LNFIRMSIZE                     -0.035 0.913 -0.354 
                               (0.08)  (1.02)  (1.20)  
LNFIRMSIZE2                       0.014*   -0.087 0.044 
                               (0.01)  (0.10)  (0.12)  
FIRMCOMP                          0.005***    0.040***    0.049*** 
                               (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
TECHPOT                           0.194***    1.698***    2.184*** 
                               (0.02)  (0.33)  (0.38)  
COOPPART                                   0.776 -0.977 
                                           (2.49)  (2.83)  
1ST STAGE RESIDUALS              -0.316 0.979 
                                           (1.49)  (1.69)  
     N                          4859 4859 4859 
Note: IV_1 considers the industry, survey year and firm size class mean of the importance of 
hampering factors a firm is facing to. IV_2 reflects the industry, survey year and firm size class 
mean of the diversity of knowledge sources used for innovation activities. The second stage 
Tobit models employ heteroscedastic-robust estimations. All stages include an intercept, time 
and industry dummies (not presented). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm 
level. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Notes 
                                                 
 
 
1
 Data about project duration is provided by ARAMIS, a database of the Swiss federal administration. 
2
 See Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2012) for an overview on relevant recent empirical studies; Cerulli 
(2010) for a critical overview on the different applied methods. 
3
 In terms of subsidized collaboration, exceptions are Sakakibara (2001) and Branstetter and 
Sakakibara (2002) who analysed Japanese government-sponsored R&D consortia and find evidence 
that participating firms have higher R&D expenditures as well as more patents. Czarnitzki et al. (2007) 
find positive effects of collaboration for subsidized firms with respect to R&D expenditures and 
patents. Indeed, many studies have considered patent application as outcome variable. Even though 
patents provide an acknowledged measure for a new technology with an important inventive step 
(provided that those patents end up being granted), a patent constitutes the first step of a new product 
and is still several steps away form a successful market innovation. Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014a), who are interested in the market potential of publicly induced R&D, do not differentiate 
between the degree of novelty of the outcome of the innovation. Likewise, while the authors take into 
account the impact of collaboration (differentiating between national and international collaboration) 
they do not differentiate between the number of different partners or the type of partners a firm is 
involved in. 
4
 We bootstrap the entire procedure (inclusive of the matching) 150 times, allowing us to estimate 
how the sample mean of our actual sample varies  due to random sampling.  
5
 The definition of R&D expenditures as well as of radical and incremental innovation follows the 
OECD guidelines (OECD, 1992). 
6
 We estimated the same model, aggregating the various collaboration partners into vertical, 
horizontal and diagonal (science) collaboration. The results remain the same. Only vertical 
collaboration was statistically significant, and negatively so. We thus do not present the detail of the 
results in the table. 
7
 We have aggregated the different types of partner into vertical, horizontal and science collaboration 
partners (CO_VER, CO_HOR, CO_SCIE) in the tobit regressions as the results are not impacted by 
this aggregation. 
8
 He have further allowed for a longer time lag between either type of R&D investment and 
innovation output. Conclusions remain unchanged. The detailed regression results can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. 
9
 We consider 22 different hampering factors which firms might face in their innovation activities. 
These hampering factors might have negative consequences on the successful realization of 
innovation projects and can be attributed to categories like high risks and high costs, ease of imitating, 
financial constraints, lack of skilled employees, lack of knowledge, organizational obstacles, as well 
as further institutional obstacles. 
10
 Relevant sources of knowledge which are captured in this variable constitute knowledge from other 
firms (costumers, suppliers, competitors, etc.), research institutions, consultancies, technological 
transfer agencies, and from other general available information (patent disclosures, conferences and 
exhibitions, scientific and technical literature, IT-supported information systems). 
